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T HE FALLOUT F ROM AT&T M OBILITY V. C ONCEPCION : PARAMETERS
E STABLISHED BY THE I NTERPRETATIONS OF L OWER C OURTS

Terry F. Moritz*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Last year, the United States Supreme Court rattled the arbitration world with its decision
in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.1 The Court’s decision in Concepcion overturned the widely
accepted Discover Bank rule2 that had been handed down by the California Supreme Court in
Discover Bank v. Superior Court.3 Discover Bank had established a fairly rigid rule that class
arbitration waivers were unconscionable and could not be enforced, thus permitting class actions
even where the parties had agreed to only individual arbitrations.4 In overturning Discover Bank,
however, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted the Discover Bank
rule and that the terms of an arbitration agreement could not be declared unconscionable simply
because they contained a class action waiver.5 Instead, the FAA dictates that arbitration
agreements – even those in adhesive contracts – must be read at face value and strictly
interpreted.6
In reaching its decision in Concepcion, the Court focused on § 2 of the FAA,
acknowledging that this provision, often referred to as the “Savings Clause,” “permits arbitration
agreements to be declared ‘unenforceable’ upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract” but that arbitration agreements can only be invalidated by generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability – not by defenses that
apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate
is at issue.7 Ruling that § 2 of the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank rule, the Court
noted that:
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1
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
2
Id. at 1753.
3
See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2008).
4
Id. at 1108.
5
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
6
Id. at 1752.
7
Id. at 1746 (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681, 687 (1996)).
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Class-wide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional
and different procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality
becomes more difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select
an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the class-certification
question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often
dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of
absent parties. The conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the
extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is
inconsistent with the FAA.8

The Court also concluded that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class
litigation,” and struck down the Discover Bank rule as hostile to the use of individual arbitration
to resolve consumer disputes.9 Although the Court noted the ways in which arbitration is “poorly
suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” – ineffectiveness of judicial review of certification
issues, informality of proceedings, inexperience of arbitrators, class certification issues, and
increased risks to defendants – the Court’s decision, nonetheless, seems to rest on a strict
application of § 2 of the FAA, rather than any policy arguments in favor of or against classwide
arbitration.10
Although the Court’s logic in the Concepcion decision is frequently criticized, within the
context of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, it is sound. In the 2009-2010 Term, the Court in
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International11 held that a party could not be compelled to
engage in class-arbitration “unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed
to do so”.12 In any arbitration agreement that contains a class action waiver it seems beyond
contest to fairly conclude that the parties have not agreed to class arbitration. The argument made
by those critical of the Concepcion decision is that because Discover Bank reaches all waivers of
class action, whether in the arbitration forum or in a court setting, the Court misapplied the
Savings Clause in § 2 of the FAA. This argument misses the point. It is only in an arbitration
setting where the agreement of the parties to arbitrate is an essential precondition. Put another
way, no one gets to elect whether the law will bind them, but they can elect to submit a matter to
an arbitration. Thus, to the extent the Discover Bank rule results in judicially compelled class
arbitration contrary to the agreement of the parties, the rule is specifically targeted at arbitration
only.
In the year since Concepcion was decided, lower courts throughout the country have had
ample opportunity to interpret the scope of the Concepcion decision.13 In fact, several hundred

8

Id. at 1750-51.
Id. at 1752.
10
Id.
11
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
12
Id. at 1775.
13
Not only have myriad lower courts interpreted Concepcion in a variety of contexts, but the U.S. Supreme Court
also recently issued an opinion in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012), in which it relied on its
adherence to the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” set forth in Concepcion to hold that the
statutory phrase “[y]ou have a right to sue a credit repair organization” in the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA)
did not bar arbitration of disputes brought under the CROA. Id. at 673. The Court specifically stated, “We think it
clear, however, that this mere ‘contemplation’ of suit in any competent court does not guarantee suit in all competent
courts, disabling the parties from adopting a reasonable forum selection clause…Had Congress meant to prohibit these
very common [arbitration] provisions in the CROA, it would have done so in a manner less obtuse than what
respondents suggest…Because the CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum,
the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms.” Id. at 671-73.
9
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cases have cited to Concepcion in some capacity. Some courts have placed limitations on the
scope of Concepcion by either holding that the specific arbitration agreement at issue was
unenforceable for reasons aside from the inclusion of a class arbitration waiver, or by
differentiating Concepcion for its application of state or federal statutory law, rather than
common law or court-made law. On the other end of the spectrum, some courts have expanded
on the Concepcion decision to strike down state laws that resembled the Discover Bank rule.
Throughout the decisions, two conflicting policy arguments seem to come into play: (1) the
inappropriateness of arbitration as a means of resolving class claims, on the one hand, and (2) the
vindication of rights doctrine (i.e. the possibility that many small-dollar claims will go unresolved
due to the costs associated with pursing individual claims), on the other. Yet, despite the many
practical implications of the Court’s decision in Concepcion, lower courts seem to base their
reasoning on an application of the FAA and contract construction principles.14

II.

THE BROAD RANGE OF LOWER COURTS’ DECISIONS

A. Cases That Limit the Scope of Concepcion by Ultimately Finding the
Arbitration Agreement at Issue to be Unenforceable on Other Grounds
Several courts continue to apply an unconscionability standard to arbitration agreements,
with some courts skirting the holding of Concepcion by ultimately finding a particular arbitration
agreement to be unenforceable for reasons aside from the inclusion of a class arbitration waiver.15
In Kanbar v. O’Melveny, for example, the Northern District of California stated that “arbitration
agreements are still subject to unconscionability analysis… [and] the doctrine of
unconscionability can override the terms of an arbitration agreement and the parties’ expectations
in connection therewith.”16 The Kanbar court ultimately held that the arbitration agreement was
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable based on its “take it or leave it” condition of
employment, its strict notice requirements, and overly burdensome confidentiality provisions.17
Other courts focus on the fact that Concepcion did not disrupt a court’s ability to declare
an arbitration agreement unenforceable for reasons other than public policy or unconscionability,
such as fraud, duress, or lack of mutual assent. Due to confusing and inconsistent provisions in
the arbitration agreement, the court in NAACP of Camden County East v. Foulke Management
Corp. ultimately held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to lack of mutual
assent.18 Likewise, in Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, a California Court of Appeal for
the Second District declared an arbitration agreement to be procedurally and substantively

14

Only dissenting opinions seem to pay more than mere lip service to the policy argument that arbitration is
poorly suited for class litigation. See e.g., Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2011) (Winter,
J., dissenting).
15
See, e.g., Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, No. C-11-0892 EMC, 2011 WL 2940690, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 21,
2011); NAACP of Camden County E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 421 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2011); Chavez v. Bank
of Am., No. C 10-653 JCS, 2011 WL 4712204, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., No.
B228027, 2011 WL 5027488, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2011); Newton v. Clearwire Corp., No. 2:11-CV-00783WBS-DAD, 2011 WL 4458971, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept 23, 2011).
16
Kanbar, 2011 WL 2940690, at *6.
17
Id. at *7.
18
NAACP of Camden County E., 421 N.J. Super. at 438.
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unconscionable based on the cumulative effect of clauses regarding arbitration appeal procedures,
the imposition of certain filing fees, and the exclusion of repossession issues from arbitration.19
Some courts choose to “pencil-out” an unconscionable provision, but uphold the
remainder of the arbitration agreement. For instance, in Chavez v. Bank of America, the Northern
District of California expunged substantively unconscionable forum selection clause from an
otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement.20
Other courts continue to apply existing jurisdictional standards of unconscionability,
provided that they do not disfavor arbitration per se. In Bernal v. Burnett, Judge Martinez for the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado, tested an arbitration agreement with a
class arbitration waiver under Colorado’s unconscionability test, which is set forth in Davis v.
MLG Corp.:
Because Colorado’s test for unconscionabilty on a contract provision
does not explicitly disfavor arbitration (class or otherwise), the degree
to which Concepcion changes the legal landscape in Colorado is
unclear. There does not appear to be any reason why the Davis factors
are not still good law. Thus, the court will consider the facts of this
case under the structure, keeping in mind the Supreme Court’s
statements and observations in Concepcion.21

B.

The Application of Concepcion to Federal or State Statutory Laws in Contrast
to Common Law or Court-Made Law

Some lower courts have differentiated the implications and scope of Concepcion based
on the application of a federal or state statutory law rather than an application of common law or
court-made law.22 For example, Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. involved allegations of
gender discrimination against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin Code
§ 8-107 et seq.23 A federal court in the Southern District of New York initially denied the
defendant’s motion to stay the action and compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement
ancillary to an employment contract. The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration following
the Court’s ruling in Concepcion.24 The court again denied the motion, holding that Concepcion
did not clearly reach rights secured under Title VII. The court specifically stated:

19

Sanchez, 2011 WL 5027488, at *10.
Chavez, 2011 WL 4712204, at *11.
21
Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1287 (2011) (citing Davis v. MLG Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986)).
22
See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL 2671813, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489 (2011).
23
Chen-Oster, 2011 WL 2671813, at *1.
24
Id.
20
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Concepcion involved the preemption of state contract law by a
federal preference for arbitration embodied in a federal statute, the
FAA…This case demands consideration of a separate issue: whether
the FAA’s objectives are also paramount when, as here, rights created
by a competing federal statute are infringed by an agreement to
arbitrate…In this case, as discussed in the April 28 Order, what is at
issue is not a right to proceed, procedurally, as a class, but rather the
right guaranteed by Title VII, to be free from discriminatory
employment practices. Chen-Oster, 2011 WL 1795297, at *12.
Because arbitrators will apply the same substantive law of Title VII as
would be applied by a federal court, see Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., 220 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir.2000), and the substantive law of Title VII
as applied by the federal courts prohibits individuals from bringing
pattern or practice claims, Chen-Oster, 2011 WL 1795297, at *11, *12
n.6, this case implicates federal statutory (Congressionally-created)
rights, not the ‘judicially-created obstacle [ ] to the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate’ that was at issue in Concepcion.25

In Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Company,26 the Court of Appeals for the Second District of
California considered complex allegations involving the California Private Attorney General Act
of 2004 (PAGA) and California’s Labor Code. The court proclaimed that “[t]he purpose of the
PAGA is not to recover damages or restitution, but to create a means of ‘deputizing’ citizens as
private attorneys general to enforce the Labor Code.” Accordingly, because the claims were
brought for the benefit of the general public, with the claimants acting as a proxy for the state to
enforce labor laws, the applicable class waivers were unenforceable. The appellate court
remanded the case to the trial court to decide whether to sever the waiver or to refuse to enforce
the arbitration clause altogether.27

C. Cases that Expand the Concepcion Holding
At the other end of the spectrum are those cases in which a lower court has expanded on
the Concepcion holding to overturn rulings similar to Discover Bank. In Litman v. Cellco
Partnership, the Third Circuit refused to follow the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware,28 which prohibited class waivers in
consumer contracts of adhesion that involved disputes involving small amounts of damages.29 In
overturning Muhammad and enforcing the particular arbitration agreement at issue, the Third
Circuit noted:

25

Id. at *3.
128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 856 (2011).
27
Id. at 868. It is worth noting, however, that a court in the Northern District of California upheld an arbitration
agreement subject to plaintiffs’ Sherman Act allegations, stating that "it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that
claims involving federal statutory rights, and in particular antitrust claims, are subject to arbitration." In re Apple &
AT&TM Antitrust Litigation, 2011 WL 6018401 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011).
28
Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011).
29
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006).
26
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We understand the holding of Concepcion to be both broad
and clear: a state law that seeks to impose class arbitration despite a
contractual agreement for individualized arbitration is inconsistent
with, and therefore preempted by, the FAA, irrespective of whether
class arbitration ‘is desirable for unrelated reasons.’30

Similarly, in Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation, a New Jersey federal court
rather reluctantly followed the direction of Concepcion and found that Muhammad was no longer
good law.31 Accordingly, the arbitration clause that contained a class action waiver was deemed
not to be unconscionable.32
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Concepcion broadly in applying it to the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and held that “[i]nsofar as Florida law
would invalidate [arbitration] agreements as contrary to public policy [ ], such a state law would
‘stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution’ of the FAA.”33 In Cruz v. Cingular
Wireless, the plaintiffs had argued that the remedial purpose of the FDUTPA would be hindered
by enforcement of the arbitration agreement, since most claims brought under the FDUTPA
would go unprosecuted unless brought as a class due to the fact that they involve small dollar
amounts.34 Because Concepcion had rejected this exact argument, the Eleventh Circuit held that
“faithful adherence to Concepcion” required that the court enforce the arbitration agreement
regardless of any public policy arguments to the contrary.35

III.

THE CONTINUING UTILITY OF THE VINDICATION OF RIGHTS DOCTRINE
IN LIGHT OF CONCEPCION

A. The American Express Trilogy
In In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation (“Amex I”), plaintiffs, a putative class
of low volume merchants, initiated a Sherman Act claim alleging violations of federal antitrust
laws.36
In Amex I, the court considered the enforcement of a mandatory arbitration clause in a
merchant’s contract with American Express, which also contained a “class action waiver,” a
provision that prohibited any party to the contract from pursuing anything other than individual
arbitration claims.37 The Second Circuit found the class action waiver unenforceable, “because
enforcement of the clause would effectively preclude any action seeking to vindicate the statutory
rights asserted by the plaintiffs.”38 This concept that collective action in certain circumstances
must be permitted because without such collective action, wrongful conduct would go

30

Litman, 655 F.3d at 231 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753).
Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 10-cv-3338 (NLH)(KMW), 2011 WL 2490939, at *6-7 (D. N.J.
June 22, 2011).
32
Id. at *6.
33
Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, 648 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1214.
36
In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009).
37
Id. at 310-11.
38
Id. at 304.
31
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unchallenged, is known as the “vindication of rights doctrine.” In re American Express is a
textbook example of the doctrine and some of the issues it raises when it arises in an arbitration
context.
Amex I made its way to the Supreme Court, where it was remanded for reconsideration in
light of its decision in Stolt-Nielsen.39 Upon reconsideration, the Second Circuit issued its
decision in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation (“Amex II”),40 holding that its original
analysis was unaffected by Stolt-Nielsen.41 Accordingly, it again reversed the district court’s
decision and remanded for further proceedings,42 but placed a hold on its mandate in order for
American Express to file a petition seeking a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. While the
mandate was on hold, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Concepcion. The Second Circuit
thereafter reviewed its prior decisions and concluded, in In re American Express Merchants’
Litigation (“Amex III”), that “Concepcion does not alter our analysis, and we again reverse the
district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.”43
The plaintiffs in Amex I asserted a tying arrangement imposed on them by requiring them
to honor all American Express cards.44 In the district court, the plaintiff had submitted an
affidavit from an economist establishing the fiscal impracticality of individual antitrust claims,
and the Second Circuit had found such evidence to be compelling.45
In Amex III, the Second Circuit acknowledged that Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen, taken
together, stand for the principle that parties cannot be forced to arbitrate disputes in a class-action
arbitration unless the parties agree to class action arbitration,46 but the court went on to note:
What Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not do is require that all
class-action waivers be deemed per se enforceable. That leaves open
the question presented on this appeal: whether a mandatory class
action waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs are able to
demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement would be to
preclude their ability to bring federal antitrust claims. While we cannot
rely on Concepcion or Stolt-Nielsen to answer the question before us,
we continue to find useful guidance in other Supreme Court decisions
addressing the issue of vindicating federal statutory rights via
arbitration.47

In Amex III, the Second Circuit noted that longstanding Supreme Court precedent
recognized that the class action device is the only economical alternative when a large group of
individuals or entities has suffered an alleged wrong, but the damages due to any single individual
or entity are too small to justify bringing an individual action.

39

Am. Express Co.v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758).
In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011).
41
Id. at 189.
42
Id. at 200.
43
In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
44
Amex I, 554 F.3d at 308.
45
See, e.g., Amex III, 667 F.3d at 212.
46
Amex III, 667 F.3d at 213.
47
Id. at 214.
40
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A critical fact in this litigation is that petitioner’s individual
stake in the damages award he seeks is only $70. No competent
attorney would undertake this complex antitrust action to recover so
inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates that petitioner’s
suit proceed as a class action or not at all.48

The court then looked to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth49 and
noted that in dicta, the Mitsubishi Court said that should clauses in a contract operate “as a
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”50
Quoting its own opinion in Amex I, the court noted:
While dicta, it is dicta based on a firm principle of antitrust law that an
agreement which in practice acts as a waiver of future liability under
the federal antitrust statutes is void as a matter of public policy. More
than a half-century ago, the Supreme Court stated that ‘in view of the
public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws through the
instrumentality of the private treble-damage action,’ an agreement
which confers even ‘a partial immunity from civil liability for future
violations’ of the antitrust laws is inconsistent with the public interest.51

The Second Circuit next looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Green Tree Financial
Corporation–Alabama v. Randolph52 and noted:
We continue to find [Green Tree] ‘controlling here to the
extent that it holds that when a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration
agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of
incurring such costs.’53

Finding that American Express had brought no serious challenge to the plaintiffs’
demonstration that their claims cannot reasonable be pursued as individual actions, whether in
federal court or in arbitration, and that the enforcement of the class action waiver in the Card
Acceptance Agreement “flatly ensures that no small merchant may challenge American Express
[‘s] tying arrangements under the federal antitrust laws,”54 the Court concluded:

48

Id. (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)).
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
50
Amex II, 634 F.3d at 197 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19).
51
Id. (quoting Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955).
52
Green Tree Fin, Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
53
Amex II, 634 F.3d at 197 (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92).
54
Amex III, 667 F.3d at 218 (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d at 319).
49

153

Since the plaintiffs cannot pursue these claims as class arbitration,
either they can pursue them as judicial class action or not at all. If they
are not permitted to proceed in a judicial class action, then, they will
have been effectively deprived of the protection of the federal
antitrust-law. The defendant will thus have immunized itself against all
such antitrust liability by the expedient of including in its contracts of
adhesion an arbitration clause that does not permit class arbitration,
irrespective of whether or not the provision explicitly prohibits class
arbitration.
Therefore, in light of the fact that the arbitration provision at
issue here does not allow for class arbitration, under Stolt-Nielsen and
by its terms, if the provision were enforced it would strip the plaintiffs
of rights accorded them by statute. We conclude that this arbitration
clause is unenforceable. We remand to the district court with the
instruction to deny the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.55

B.

The Continuing Validity of the American Express Trilogy

Other courts have called into question the validity of the Second Circuit’s analysis in the
American Express cases. For example, D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp. calls into doubt the
viability of the American Express reasoning following the Court’s holding in Concepcion.56 The
plaintiffs in D’Antuono sued their employer alleging violations of both federal and state
employment laws.57 The D’Antuono court ultimately skirted the issue of whether Concepcion left
American Express undisturbed, however, finding that the Connecticut Supreme Court has never
been confronted with an arbitration agreement that included not only a class action waiver, but
also a cost- and fee-shifting provision, such as the arbitration agreement in the case at hand.58
The court did, however, call into doubt any attempts to thwart arbitration, noting:
It is not necessary for the Court to consider whether the FAA would
preempt Connecticut law to the extent that it required invalidation of an
arbitration agreement like the one at issue in this case, since the Court
has no reason whatsoever to believe that the Connecticut Supreme
Court would invalidate such an agreement.59

In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that Concepcion distinguished between the
preemption of the FAA over state substantive unconscionability principles, but not over state
procedural unconscionability principles, the Court stated: “To the contrary, this Court reads the
AT&T Mobility decision as casting significant doubt on virtually any ‘device or formula’ which
might be a vehicle for ‘judicial hostility toward arbitration.’”60
Shortly after the Connecticut court delivered its decision in D’Antuono, the plaintiffs
sought an interlocutory appeal. In granting the motion to file an interlocutory appeal, the district
court stated that it was persuaded that the case involved conflicting controlling questions of law.61

55

Amex III, 667 F.3d at 219.
D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 322 (D. Conn. 2011).
57
Id. at 313.
58
Id. at 331.
59
Id. at 330.
60
Id.
61
D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., No. 3:11CV33 (MRK), 2011 WL 2222313, at *1 (D. Conn. June 7, 2011).
56
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The court indicated that it had rendered its decision based on American Express and other case
law involving the federal common law of arbitrability, but that “there is a great deal of
uncertainty surrounding the continuing validity of the federal common law of arbitrability
doctrines on which Plaintiffs rely.”62
In Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, the plaintiff argued that Concepcion did not
disturb the vindication of rights doctrine under federal common law.63 The plaintiff contended
that Concepcion left room for a court to conduct an “individualized case-by-case” analysis of
whether binding the plaintiff to individual arbitration would prevent a vindication of rights, in
which case the arbitration agreement should be unenforceable.64 In support of this position, the
plaintiff pointed to American Express, but the court found that because American Express
involved litigation of federal claims, whereas Kaltwasser involved the litigation of state claims,
American Express had no bearing on the case before it.65
Nonetheless, the Kaltwasser court stated that, even assuming that American Express and
Green Tree Financial Corporation – Alabama v. Randolph,66 (the Supreme Court case on which
American Express was predicated) had involved state law claims, Concepcion still left no room
for a case-by-case analysis of the cost and benefits at stake.67 The court reasoned that
Concepcion acknowledged that small-dollar claims might slip through the cracks due to the
expenses incurred with litigating a claim (a fact that the Concepcion dissent found particularly
troubling), but did not draw significant attention to this point in reaching its conclusion, which
lead the Kaltwasser court to conclude that Concepcion does not allow the plaintiffs to avoid an
arbitration agreement based on a case-by-case analysis of the costs and benefits at stake.68
Moreover, even if the vindication of rights doctrine survives following Concepcion, the
Kaltwasser court held that the application of the cost-benefit analysis is “confined to
circumstances in which a plaintiff argues that costs specific to the arbitration process, such as
filing fees and arbitrator’s fees, prevent her from vindicating her claims,” and not the costs of
pursuing the underlying cause of action.69
Accordingly, while some lower courts have clearly set specific parameters on the scope
of Concepcion, lingering issues regarding the breadth of the Concepcion holding – particularly
whether Concepcion applies to federal and state statutes and whether the vindication of rights
doctrine is intact – remain. Given the conflicting holdings of lower courts and the high stakes
involved with lawsuits of this type, it is likely that American Express will make its way to the
Supreme Court. Several uncertainties remain following Concepcion and the interpretations of
lower courts, including:

62

Id.
Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
64
Id. at 1047.
65
Id. at 1048.
66
Green Tree Financial Corporation – Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
67
Kaltwasser, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1050.
63
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IV.

1.

Will the vindication of rights doctrine as set out in American
Express and similar cases be taken up by the Supreme Court?

2.

Under the federal common law of arbitrability, as set forth in
American Express and similar cases, and in light of Concepcion, are
district courts permitted to inquire into general public policy
concerns and the vindication of rights doctrine in determining
whether a particular arbitration agreement is enforceable, or must
they instead only look to the economic feasibility of arbitration
under the circumstances?

3.

How will the courts square differing congressional objectives of
various federal statutory laws, such as the FAA, the Sherman Act,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and federal employment laws?

CONCLUSION

In the one year since the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Concepcion decision, the
decision has continued to be as unsettling as it appeared to be when the decision was first handed
down. Given the prevalence of arbitration in our legal system today, it is not surprising that the
Concepcion decision has had far-reaching implications. What is surprising, however, is the broad
range of interpretations that have been pronounced by the lower courts in the relatively short time
since the decision was rendered. Some courts seem reluctant to follow Concepcion and find a
way to hold fast to previous standards of unconsionability with respect to arbitration agreements.
Other courts have made distinctions based on the application of state or federal statutory law,
versus common law or court-made law, to the underlying claim. And other courts have explicitly
acknowledged that Concepcion calls into doubt precedent that is central to the enforceability of
arbitration agreements, such as the vindication of rights doctrine and a plaintiff’s ability to avoid
an arbitration agreement based on a cost-benefit analysis. One thing remains certain: we have not
seen the end of Concepcion-driven issues. However, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court
has not lost its commitment to sustaining arbitration agreements against competing state laws
based on a state’s policy preferences.
Most recently, the Supreme Court overturned a decision of the West Virginia Supreme
Court holding that an agreement to arbitrate claims against a nursing home, including those
involving personal injury or wrongful death, was unenforceable.70 In Marmet Health Care
Center v. Brown, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in which it found that the “West
Virginia court’s interpretation was both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in the
precedents of this Court [and that] the FAA provides no exception for personal-injury or
wrongful-death claims. [Rather,] it ‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to
arbitrate.’“71 The Court went on to find that the West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision to
except personal injury and wrongful death claims from agreements to arbitrate in the nursing
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Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
Id. at 1203.
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home area amounted to a categorical prohibition on the arbitration of a certain type of claim,
which is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.72
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Id. at 1203-04.
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